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The paper addresses technological and operational challenges of developing a global 
plug-and-play Maritime Domain Security testbed. This joint NPS-LLNL project, 
supported by partners from Sweden, Austria, and Singapore is based on the NPS Tactical 
Network Topology (TNT) comprised of long-haul OFDM networks combined with self-
forming wireless mesh links to radiation detection sensors, and real-time radiation 
awareness collaboration with geographically distributed partners.  In the center of our 
discussion are networking, sensor,  and collaborative  solutions for the Maritime 
Interdiction Operation (MIO) Experiments in which geographically distributed command 
centers and subject matter experts collaborate with the Boarding Party in real time to 
facilitate situational understanding and course of action selection. The most recent 
experiment conducted in the San Francisco Bay jointly with partners from Sweden, 
Singapore, and Austria proved feasibility and good potential of the proposed key 
technologies aimed at improving MIO.  
. 
In our discussion of TNT MIO Experiments, Dr. Alex Bordetsky presents TNT MIO 
Testbed,   ship-to-shore and ship-to-ship networking solutions and collaborative 
technology for net-centric MIO. 
 
Dr. Arden Dougan discusses experiences using radiation detection and explosives 




Dr. Foo Yu Chiann elaborates on the TNT MIO node in Singapore and its role in the 
experiment…. 
 
Singapore participated in the Experiment through a Virtual Private Network (VPN) 
connection established between the Defence Science and Technology Agency (DSTA) 
and NPS. Singapore not only observed the Experiment but also provided injects in the 
role of the shipping company that had unknowingly transported the radioactive cargo as 
part of its shipment.  
 
 
Cdr. Anders Kilhberg elaborates on the TNT MIO testbed node in Southern Sweden and, 
it’s role and the plans for unfolding collaboration with SNWC. 
 
Swedish Naval Warfare Centre (SNWC) has participated in the TNT experiments since 
TNT 06-2 both as observers and as collaborators. Sweden participates through a Virtual 
Private Network (VPN) connection with is established at the Naval Warfare Centre in 
Karlskrona in the southern part of Sweden. Sweden acts as a counterpart Maritime 
Security Organization (MSO) and will conduct Maritime Interdiction Operation (MIO) 
within the Baltic Sea. SNWC provides injects and live video feed into the network. 
Radiation data is posted in the collaboration tool for reachback organization to analyze. 
The long running aim with Sweden’s participation in the TNT MIO testbed is to have a 
full scale, 2 day, experiment during fall 2008 under the heading “Wireless Broadband 
supporting Maritime Security in Littoral Waters”. The aim with this experiment will be to 
set up an ad hoc network in an area in the Baltic sea supporting cooperation between the 
military and civil authorities (e.g. police, coast guard) solving attempt to smuggling (e.g. 
CBRN, people). To reach that goal Sweden will use the experiments as stepstones to try 
to fulfill that goal. For the next experiment in this series 07-2, we will try to test a CBRN 
sensor and communication jacket (prototype) and try to hoc it up on the network. 
 
1. Introduction  
Since 2004 a joint  team of Naval Postgraduate School and Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory researchers is operating a plug-and-play testbed, which enables discovery, 
integration,  and demonstration experiments for a broad range of Maritime Interdiction 
Operation scenarios including mesh and long-haul wireless networking with radiation 
detection sensors, boarding party collaboration with remote expert teams, reachback to 
different locations around the globe.  
 
The operational focus of NPS-LLNL experiments is on finding viable solutions for MIO 
connectivity and collaboration providing for rapid  radiation awareness, biometrics 
identification,  non-proliferation machinery parts search , and explosive materials 
detection on the board of the target vessel during the boarding party search phase 
 
The testbed contains a tactical, OFDM 802.16 backbone, terminating in various locations 
within the 200 mi length in Northern California (Fig. 1), which provides for the ad hoc 
plug-in of UAVs, boats, ships, small SOF and Marine units, including airborne and 
ground self-forming mesh communications. It contains an expanding set of domestic and 
overseas remote command and tactical centers with global reach back capabilities and 
rapidly   deployable self-forming wireless clusters (including student network operation 
services 24/7). The Maritime component being developed jointly with the Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory extends the testbed capabilities to ship-to-shore, ship-to-
ship, ship-UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle)-ship, ship-USV (Unmanned Surface 
Vehicle)-ship, and ship-AUV (Autonomous Underwater Vehicle), sensor mesh mobile 





Ft. Ord  MOUT 
U.S. Army 
SATCOM 
MOA with Ft. 
Hunter 
Liggett, USAR 
NPS McMillan Field 
UAV Flight Facility 
Unlimited Use of 
Restricted Air Space 
~100 mi 
NPS CIRPAS 














Alameda   
Island, CA
VP
Research backbone to be extended in 06: Sweden, Austria, Australia, Singapore 
    In Progress 
S.F. Bay 
 










• Wireless Network Technologies 
• Agile, Adaptive Networks 
• Ship-to-Shore links for exfiltration  
• of data to reach-back centers (802.16, 
802.20, VPN-Internet/Satellite) 
• Ship self-forming network based on 
ITT  
   mesh solution 
• Robust comms at 1.5-4km 




Figure 2. Testbed in Action During the MIO 06-2 Experiment 
  
2. Typical Scenario for Maritime  Radiation Awareness and Interdiction 
Experiments 
Over the course of 6 consecutive   discovery and demonstration experiments the 
MIO scenario evolved into  script which employs coordinated actions of multiple 
agencies and institutions involved in homeland security operations and especially those 
related to maritime interdiction, interception and control:  
 
According to intelligence, a cargo vessel that departed country X in early 
February is carrying a terrorist cell with hazardous (radiological) material and is 
attempting to enter the country via a West coast port. The Vessel’s name and port of 
arrival are unknown. 
Multiple boarding operations are ongoing (and updates are posting to Maritime 
Intelligence Fusion Center - MIFC via E-Wall).  Intel has updated information and has 
high confidence that a vessel entering Washington State has the terrorists onboard.  
Simulated deception event is that USCG and NSWC are coordinating the vessel’s 
takedown and that is happening with updates to E-wall. 
Under that course of action, USCG has ordered one of its vessels (simulated by 
MARAD SS Gem State) to stop, board, and search a ship (simulated by USCG Tern) 
suspected of transporting radiological material as well as a terrorist cell. In order to do 
that, while the suspect vessel is underway, a RHIB with a boarding team is employed.  
Level I boarding team have conducted a search of the vessel due to its status as an 
HIV. They were equipped with RadPagers. During the inspection, a neutron alarm was 
triggered on a RadPager. The alarm was a constant alarm, not spurious counts. The level I 
team practiced SMAC and called in a Level II team to resurvey the ship with their 
additional radiation detection equipment. This is an LE mission.  
So, in order to assist in locating suspects, uranium enriching equipment and 
explosives, the USCG Operations Center, Alameda has directed its Level II boarding 
team to employ radiation detection, explosives detection, and biometric equipment to 
help expedite this at-sea search.  Since there are numerous commercial uses for certain 
radioactive sources and positive identification of the source in a short time is imperative, 
a network extension capability is utilized from the suspect vessel to the boarding team’s 
launch vessel and ashore. This rapidly deployable, collaborative network is reaching back 
to LLNL and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) to assist in identification of 
suspect cargo.  Support from the National Biometric Fusion Center must be used to 
quickly and accurately discriminate between actual vessel crewmembers and non-crew 
suspects.  
The tasking for Level II boarding team is to conduct a survey of the cargo ship 
and identify the source of the neutron readings utilizing Radpager, identiFINDER and 
RadPack devices. Also, using biometrics recording devices, crew members must be taken 
their fingerprints and that biometrics data is to be to BFC for identification. 
The expected boarding scenario events are the following:  
• Hidden neutron source in engine room and hidden gamma source as cargo. BFC 
fingerprints Captain and crew. 
• First gamma spectrum of gamma source taken is poorly done because the 
boarding party took too short of a spectrum. Reachback can ask for second 
spectrum for analysis). Gamma spectrum of neutron source and photos sent to 
reachback and export control for identification.  
• Once the identification of the items is passed to the boarding team and fed to 
MIFC, the cognitive process clock starts where the experts work in collaboration 
with MIFC and USCG support vessel to understand the situation and come up 
with a course of action to deal with the threat. 
• Once the captain of the ship is located, he can inform the boarding party that he 
had a soil density gauge that emitted neutrons (but only after we send spectra and 
photos of item).(Export control should identify it as soil density gauge.) 
Unfortunately it was stolen. The captain can’t explain the gamma source- possible 
terrorist threat? Captain’s fingerprints show him to be on a watch list. 
The radiological material will be simulated by detection files that will provide the 
LLNL analysis team with some ambiguity about the severity of the material. Once that 
determination is passed to the boarding team and fed to MIFC, the cognitive process 
clock starts where the experts work in collaboration with MIFC, USCG and boarding 





3. Major Networking Segments of the TNT MIO Testbed 
 
 
A. OFDM/802.16 mobile man-portable network extension connecting providing 
ship-to-shore and ship-to-ship broadband communications. Short for Orthogonal 
Frequency Division Multiplexing, an FDM modulation technique for transmitting 
large amounts of digital data over a radio wave. OFDM works by splitting the 
radio signal into multiple smaller sub-signals that are then transmitted 
simultaneously at different frequencies to the receiver: multiple carrier waves take 
the place of and carry the data of one large wave. One of the key benefits of 
OFDM is that the multiple carrier waves overlap, which provides a very efficient 
use of the frequency bandwidth by packing more data into the bandwidth 
compared to what can be achieved with a single larger carrier wave spread across 
the same spectrum. Also, OFDM reduces the amount of crosstalk in signal 
transmissions. Among others, the IEEE 802.11a and 802.11g Wi-Fi standards also 
use OFDM as well as IEEE 802.16. 
 
 
B. ITT Mesh connecting  the boarding party onboard the RHIB during their 
transition to Target Vessel and on board the Target Vessel providing wireless 
mesh capability to the boarding party members. 
 
Not much data exists on the aforementioned wireless mesh technology that uses a 
center frequency of 900 MHz since it’s a proprietary technology of ITT (owned by 
Motorola). 
 
C. 802.20 FLASH OFDM (Fast, Low-Latency Access with Seamless Handoff 
Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing) 
 
Introduced by Flarion Technologies, Inc. (owned by QUALCOMM Incorporated) 
FLASH-OFDM utilized in the 802.20 standard is a direct competitor to the yet to arrive 
802.16e mobile broadband standard. IEEE 802.20 standard is capable of providing 
connectivity to the BS of SS moving up to speeds of 200-300 knots. FLASH-OFDM 
differs from 802.16 OFDM applications, in that it is vertically layered across the network, 
link and physical layers of the OSI model. This implementation is possible because in an 
IP network, only the layers above the network layer need to be layered horizontally to 
ensure interoperability across multiple link layer technologies. The 802.16 standard 
utilizes multiple MACs for multiple Physical layers and has run into design challenges 
because of the large amount of internetworking needed between the 802.16 MAC and 
PHY layers. 802.20 on the other hand utilizes a non-contention MAC together with 
OFDM which allows for the support of many low bit rate dedicated control channels. 
Therefore, IEEE 802.20 standard isn’t subject to various performance variations and 
inefficiencies when dealing with mobile users like IEEE 802.16 because it provides a 
fully scheduled uplink and downlink air resource to the user while IEEE 802.16 MAC  is 
provided primarily through a contention-based access scheme. 
During the TNT 06-02 experiment the utilized frequency was approximately 700 




D. UWB portable data communications equipment. 
 
UWB has its origins in military secure communications. While in Spread Spectrum 
(DSSS / FHSS) the bandwidth is in the range of MHZ, in UWB it’s in the range of GHz. 
Instead of modulating a continuous wave form RF signal with a specific carrier frequency 
(narrowband communication systems), UWB use carrierless, short duration pulses with 
very low duty cycle (Ton/(Ton+Toff) < 0.5%) that spread their energy across a wide 
range of frequencies (while in SS carrier is always present).  
Therefore, mainly because of the obstacle penetrating capabilities as well as the 
extremely high throughput over short distances (as said, UWB might replace USB 2 and 
IEEE 1394 wired connections between peripherals) providing the ability of excellent 
streaming video quality, UWB is ideal for use inside a ship’s hull. 
 
 
 4. Collaborative  Network for Maritime  Radiation Awareness and 
Interdiction Experiments 
 
The diagrams in Figure 3 and Figure 4 below show the MIO Logical Network set up  
in San Francisco Bay, which Stiletto joined as a mobile command post pier sided in San 
Diego (Fig. 3).  Each of these nodes had a specific role in the scenario and participated 
differently in the collaborative environment. Their roles are described following the 
diagrams. 
 
 Figure 3.  TNT 06-4 MIO Network in SF Bay Area 
 
 
Figure 4a.  OFDM Wireless Network in SF Bay Area 
 
 
Figure 4b.  OFDM Nodes along coastline from SF Bay to Camp Roberts 
  
Figure 5.  OFDM Wireless connection to Stiletto in San Diego 
 
5. MAJOR EXPERIMENT PLAYERS AND ROLES 
 
Networking / Technical Advisors (NOC (NPS) & TOC) 
 Role: to provide their expertise to the Boarding Party (BP) to deal with complex 
networking problems that might arise at any point of the boarding operation that would 
obstruct them from exploiting the unique capabilities offered by the network.  
 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) 
Role: to provide Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) expertise and specifically 
radiological material detection, identification, categorization, origin tracing, their 
correlation with other related findings worldwide, and evaluation of their associated 
dangers and implications from their discovery. That expertise also includes the 
identification of certain materials that can lead to the development of WMD, such as 
machinery and other non-proliferation materials.   
 
MIFC (Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center) 
Role: to provide maritime traffic information such as ships’ registries, cargo and crew 
manifests, ports of call, and shipping schedules. This information is helpful in order to 
designate a vessel as suspect, locate it, make its interdiction possible, and confirm 
discrepancies onboard, such as fake documentation.  
 
Command Center (NPS) & District 11 (tactical / operational commanders) 
Role: Primary decision makers concerned with decisions before, during, and after the 
boarding, with particular emphasis on post-sensor analysis of the suspect vessel. The 
boarding officer is their “tool” onboard the ship, making decisions at the lowest level, 
following pre-established SOP’s including how to organize and conduct the search using 
the best resources at his/her disposal. The decision making level of the tactical or 
operational commanders may differ depending on the context of each boarding case, 
their parental organizations, relevant policies and standing orders. The primary purpose 
of the collaborative network is to enhance the Boarding Party’s situational awareness, 
even more importantly that of the boarding officer. 
 
Boarding Party 
Role: to physically enter the vessel and carry out a thorough visual and sensor 
inspection to locate the source of radiation detected by the drive-by sensor. The BP will 




Role: to act (experimentally) as a MIO unit, capable of fast transfer of the BP to the 
target, providing launch vessel and intermediate node capabilities. 
 
 
Singapore (as Shipping Company) 
Role: to provide the above information to maritime intelligence / maritime domain law 
enforcement agencies such as MIFC (in this experiment, to explain the presence of 
specific materials and/or personnel onboard the suspect vessel). 
 
Sweden 
Role: to act as a counterpart MIO agency, conducting the same operations and 
exchanging real time information that might be useful to them or to the TNT operation. 
 
 
Based on the observations of the MIO team members after having the opportunity to 
both observe and actively portray the roles in each node, Figure 1 was re-created as 
Figure 4 (below) to reflect the team’s perception of the collaborative network that existed 
during the experiment. Note the high number of arrows between the Technical Reach-
back nodes – those entities supporting the technical aspects of the experiment – and the 
Coast Guard nodes. The expertise housed in the Technical Reach-back nodes is a 
resource in high demand from multiple operational nodes, but is also an extremely 
constrained resource. The ability to simultaneously “deploy” the technical expertise to 
multiple locations/events through the collaborative environment is an essential benefit for 
military and Homeland Security operations. 
The one major deviation from the “real world” Coast Guard structure during this 
experiment environment is the role of the Yerba Buena Island node.  In the actual Coast 
Guard chain of command, Sector San Francisco would replace the YBI TOC and would 
exercise some of the command and control (C2) role played by D11. In addition, the 
critical logistics role played by the YBI node for the experiment would not be necessary 
because the technology and network management issues would be addressed before 
this collaborative environment was fielded. During future experiments, it may be 
beneficial to gradually decrease the dependence on this node by slowly distributing its 
responsibilities to the District 11, Boarding Vessel (BV), Boarding Team (BT), and NOC 
nodes. 
Student watchstanders at the NOC were prepared to serve as surrogate role players 
for the various foreign partner nodes, in addition to facilitating their connectivity and 




















Figure 6.  MIO TNT Collaborative Network Nodes (courtesy Rideout, Creigh, and Dash) 
 
 
6. Application environment of MIO collaborative network nodes that 
Stiletto joined. 
Groove Virtual Office provided the majority of the collaborative tools for this 
experiment. The following workspaces were created to perform the tasks listed 
below: 
1) TOC and Networking 
• To resolve network malfunctions/issues and optimize network performance 
• To coordinate logistics and issues outside the scenario environment 
2) Boarding Party (BP) 
• To analyze and compare spectrum files (among remote experts) 
• To track radiation materials (among remote experts) 
• To share atmospheric modeling and predictions (among remote experts) 
• To consider emergency medical actions (among remote experts) 
• To post biometrics matches (NBFC) 
• To post radiation files/photos (BP) 
• To post responses/expert evaluations (LLNL) 
• To post recommendations on BP’s further actions / when additional search 
information is required (LLNL-NBFC) 
3) District 11 
• To command and control assets 
• To direct agencies and assets not directly under the commander’s authority 
• To command BP to appropriate actions 
 
Each of the collaborative network nodes utilized a subset of the available CT 
tools. The section below provides a breakdown of each node and a description of 
their collaborative environment. 
 
District 11 – Rusty Dash. 
The combination of the tools listed below provided the ability to remotely monitor 
both the status of operational assets (boats/vessels) and the progress of scenario 
events. This resulted in excellent situational awareness for the decision maker. 
Groove was used in the following ways or to perform the following functions: 
• Discussion Board / Chat – for text communication between nodes.  The 
discussion board is better than chat because it enforces hierarchy 
relationships of the different posts.  This makes it much easier to follow 
information in the asynchronous and distributed decision making 
environment. 
• File Transfer – primarily for distributing data files from the BT to/from the 
Reach-back facilities.   
• Task Manager – using this tool in the control (TOC and Networking) 
workspace gave participants an easy and informative way to monitor the 
progress of the scenario.  It was an excellent use of a previously unused 
Groove tool. 
SA Agent provides the geographic positions of the assets and status of the 
network links for the mobile nodes. 
EWall was used to monitor information alerts.  However, the sparse number of 
alerts posted in EWall limited the effectiveness of the tool during this experiment. 
VOIP phone was an excellent tool for voice communications.  Video streams 
were monitored from various nodes, but this functionality was not critical to the D11 
decision making process. 
 
Boarding Officer – Brian Rideout and George Stavroulakis. 
Of the various features (often referred to as “tools” within various collaborative 
applications) there are 3 fundamentals in the Groove application that apply 
specifically to the MIO scenario.  They are:  
1) Discussion.  Utilize standardized naming conventions and SOPs for introducing 
new threads.  Employ the thread technique to better organize data (decreases 
look-up time of information thereby speeding up the Orient/Decide processes 
within the OODA loop).  It provides excellent, near-real-time “chat” capability 
while archiving all discussions for all parties.  Additionally, person-to-person 
discussions can be established and continued to cover communications not 
pertinent/appropriate for the entire workspace. 
2) Task-Manager.  Create a flexible, scalable MIO model that can rapidly expand to 
cover all aspects of the various boarding missions: one for a radiation scenario, 
counter-drug, weapons, suspected terrorist(s), etc.  With an adaptable template, 
users will become familiar with those components most frequently used while 
retaining the option of expanding the task-manager’s options depending on the 
situation.  Familiarity breeds confidence and increases our orientation/decision 
cycle in the OODA loop. 
3) Files.  This tool is used primarily to transfer data (photos, video, biometrics, 
radiation data, etc) to be collaborated on by reach back analytical agencies.  
Features like pictures, notepad, and sketch (in Groove) are redundant and bog 
down users.  Workspaces can be configured to reflect only those features the 
users intend to use thereby minimizing the temptation to open another feature.  
Additionally, fewer features in the workspace will force users to use only those 
available with the option of expanding the workspace through the additional of 
more tools; less features equals less to review equals less time spent with a 
head buried in the computer. 
On another note, a camera acts more like a sensor and less like a collaborative 
“tool.”  The data it captures can be collaborated on (by humans) once it has been 
disseminated via the network (Groove has capability of posting/sharing the file but 
the humans using Groove then collaborate on the data presented in the file).  
Whether still imagery or streaming video, we tend to categorize cameras in the 
collaboration realm rather than “sensor” domain. 
Additionally, the laptop that was supposed to be used for Situational Awareness 
Agent (SA Agent) aboard the BV was not brought along for the boarding.  The lack of 
Alerts, Geospatial data, Network connection (Agent information) and video had a 
noticeable impact on the BT’s situation awareness.  SA Agent’s capabilities would be 
especially beneficial in a complex MIO with multiple surface craft on the water.  
Having that kind of SA (especially at night) would be beneficial to law enforcement 
and collaborators alike. 
 
Boarding Vessel – Bob Creigh. 
The BV primary CT Tools were Groove and the VOIP phone.  The BV was a 
coordination entity that provided a bond between the TOC, D11 and the BT.  The BV 
also provided the physical network link between the TV and YBI 802.16 node.  The 
BV also provided a video feed.  This camera was placed on the bridge of the BV but 
in a real situation would probably stay locked on the TV.  The BV did not make use of 
the SA Agent during this experiment but it should be used in the future.  
Groove proved to be a very valuable tool for the BV team.  The first day of the 
experiment the network latency was unacceptable and we primarily used cell phones 
for communications.  On the second day these problems were rectified and both 
Groove and the VOIP phone proved exceptionally valuable.  The VOIP phone is an 
outstanding tool and should be used even more widely in future experiments. 
 
Stiletto Ship (specific type of BV) – Jeff Withee. 
Groove provided the majority of the CT tools.  It was utilized for Chat, discussion, 
File Sharing, pictures, and task management.  Video and Voice communications 
were provided by VStream.  Additional voice communications were conducted using 
Cell phones. 
 
CENETIX NOC – Dave Schilling, RJ Simmons, Ed Pena, Doris Alvarez, Ed 
Macalanda, Mike Farrell. 
The NOC utilized all of the available collaborative tools for the experiment: 
Groove, E-Wall, SA Agent, Video Conferencing, and Audio Conferencing.  Groove 
was used for file sharing, messaging, chat, discussion board, pictures, and web links.  
This constituted approximately 80% of the CT utilization.  EWall was used about 10% 
and teleconference another 10% mainly for coordination during the initial experiment 
setup. 
The Austrian team utilized Groove, E-Wall, SA Agent, a live Video link, and 
occasional Cell Phone communication.   
Sweden participated in the SA agent as number 26. 
 
 
Figure 7. Collaboration with remote sites involved in drive-by radiation detection 
 
7Conclusion 
The  last experiment proved feasibility of integrating  new Radiation Detection 
sensors in the improved tactical  MIO network and provided vital requirements for 
configuring networking and operations support capabilities   onboard Boarding Vessel  
and  remote Expert and Command Centers.   The ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore OFDM 
wireless network between Boarding Vessel  and MIO TOC allowed the Boarding Party  
team in SF Bay to communicate with the geographically distributed network of MIO 
command posts. Also, the NPS CENETIX-developed first self-aligning broadband 
wireless solution (SAOFDM), was successfully tested at SF Bay on board the Alameda 
County Sheriff's boat, in a configuration similar to Stiletto. The MIO network 
provided sufficient bandwidth for collaborative tools and multiple video feeds (1.5-3Mbps 
level), even when subjected to additional sharp zigzag movement of the vessel, to as far 
as 4.5 miles off shore. In addition, the members of the Stiletto TOC were able to 
communicate and observe video/radiation detection from the remote warning sites in 
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Objectives
• Evaluate the use of networks, advanced sensors, and 
collaborative technology for rapid Maritime Interdiction 
Operations (MIO); specifically, the ability for a 
Boarding Party to rapidly set-up ship-to-ship 
communications that permit them to search for radiation 
and explosive sources while maintaining network 
connectivity with C2 organizations, and collaborating 
with remotely located sensor experts. 
• Extend the set of participating organizations to coalition 
partners (currently includes  international teams in 
Sweden, Singapore and Austria) and first responders 
(currently includes San Francisco, Oakland Police, and 
Alameda County Marine Units) 
• Provide the recommendations for transforming 
advanced networking and collaborative technology 
capabilities into new operational procedures for 
emerging network-centric MIOs 
TNT MIO Testbed: System of 
Networks and Collaborative 
Technology for Supporting Globally 
Distributed MIOs
Plug-and-Play Sensor-Unmanned Vehicle-
Decision Maker Networking Testbed with 
Global Reachback
• Plug-and-play wide area adaptive network with global reach back 
capabilities and rapidly   deployable self-forming wireless clusters 
(including student network operation services 24/7)
• Local networking clusters: ship-to-shore, ship-to-ship, ship-UAV-ship, 
ship-USV-ship, ship-AUV, sensor mesh mobile networks
• Operational focus: Boarding Parties support, MIO connectivity and 
collaboration for radiation awareness, biometrics identification,  non-
proliferation machinery parts search , and explosive materials detection on 
the board of the target vessel during the boarding party search phase
• Testbed backbone: NPS (Monterey), USCG (Coast Guard and Yerba 
Buena Island in SF Bay Area,   Camp Roberts (Central California),
-New sites: Golden Gate Bridge, Mt. Diablo, Sacramento River 
delta
• Global VPN reach back : 
-East Coast (BFC, DTRA)
- Sweden (Navy site in Southern Sweden), 
-Austria (GATE site in Bavarian Alps-Salzburg Research)
-Singapore (DSTA), and
Example Scenario and Global Partners
Intel: Nuclear device shipped from Persian Gulf 
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NPS-LLNL MIO Cooperation Partners
State and Local Government
Alameda County Sheriff
Oakland Police Dept.
San Francisco Police Dept.














Tactical Network Topology Testbed








Field UAV Flight Facility
















































Sweden, Austria, Singapore, Australia, Canada, Germany, Israel

Networking Solutions for Rapid Radiations 
Detection and Biometrics Identification
VPN Reachback  and Mesh 
Networking with Biometrics 
Device
Broadband Ship-to-Shore/Ship-to 
Ship  Adaptive Networking : 
SAOFDM Solution
SAOFDM Network operated completely of the SA screens w/o 
experts support on board vessels
Forward Deployed Biometrics - Ship Boarding
TNT 07-2
Total response time from beginning to enter thumb prints
on suspect to receipt of ID: 
~5 sec if “bad guy”
~35 sec if “other”
At Camp Roberts Checkpoint:
Without ABIS, Local FAST ID     1-2.5 min
With ABIS and Full Encounter, TOC Data Base     2-4 min
Day 1: Data captured on target vesselExamples of Fast ID on waterData input at TOC
Day 2:  Day 2 ID
Background MIO Studies:  
Rapidly Deployable Self-Forming Network 
for  Maritime Interdiction Operations
NPS:   - FY06:  28 Thesis Students
32 Faculty
Includes 21 PhD, 4 PhD Students
- Course Projects: IS, OR, DA






















Field Experimentation Program (Dr. Dave Netzer in Lead )
Large Interdisciplinary NPS Team Broad DoD and Gov’t. 
Participation and Support
Industrial Support

























State and Local Government
Alameda County Sheriff
Oakland Police Dept.
San Francisco Police Dept.
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USMC Field Experiments i l  i t
OSD/OFT                 
HA/DR Project
/                  
/  j t
OSD/OFT             
WolfPAC – Stiletto 
Experiments
/              
lf til tt  
i t
OSD/HD                        
NPS Maritime Security 
Program      
Sites:
• Camp Roberts
• Ft. Hunter Liggett
• Monterey Bay
• San Francisco Bay
• Avon Park, FL
• etc
• Agile, Adaptive Tactical Networks
with Long-Haul Reach-back; Ground,
Airborne, Ship, Underwater
• Collaboration Technologies
• Integration with GIG-EF via DREN 
(CONUS), GIG-BE (theater locations,
satellite links), and Abilene (Internet 2 
backbone) (overseas clusters) 
• Shared Situational Awareness
• Unmanned/Autonomous Vehicles
• Network Controlled UASs
• Networked Sensors 
• Dual-use Technologies for Post-
Conflict Reconstruction, 
Stabilization, HA/DR
• IED Detection and Jamming
• Smart Antennae
• Precision Tracking and Targeting
• Network Vulnerability Assessment
• Red Team Intent
• Human Systems Integration
(Warfighters as Users and 
Evaluators)
• CONOPS
• Individual Identity Friend or Foe
• NGO-Warfighter Combined 
Operations
NJ Health              
Emergency Medical 
Response Network
• Modeling and Simulation
• Biometrics 
• Airspace Management/Deconfliction
• Data analysis and mining










May, August 05 TNT UWB comms
demonstrated within Cutter
Feb 05 TNT: 802.11B 
affected by radar
Background: Prior NPS-LLNL experiments focused 
sending data and video in real time within a boarded ship 
to external networks
UWB on board USCGC Munro 
(multi-deck, no radar) 
Tx
Rx
Suisun Bay: UWB able 
to transmit between 
holds of a container ship 
with holds closed! 
Collected system performance 
data on operational ship (Point 
Sur) UWB WORKED in difficult 
high multipath environment
Polar Star – Planned 
experiment w/ USCG 
R&D Center 
Target Ship Enters Monterey 
Bay; Collaboration with 




TNT 06-1 MIO Network Topology: Forming the 
Boarding Party network to the target ship
Interceptor: Man-
pack OFDM 802.16 
Link
Target Ship: Sel-forming 
ITT Mesh and UWB metal 
penetration links
Reach back OFDM 
802.16 Long-haul link 
to TOC/MIFC
Stretching OFDM Man-Pack Boarding 
Party Network to  Target Ship (15min)
Sending Target Crew Biometrics via 
Boarding Party Wireless Mesh network 
to the BFC (4 min)
Stretching the UWB link below the deck to 
the Radiation Detection officers
Sharing UWB Video with DTRA via Groove
MIO Adaptive Ship-to-Ship and Ship-to-Shore 
Networking On-the-Move: First SAOFDM node
Adaptive Ship-to-Shore link with Boarding Vessel 
operational behind port structures in the 
Oakland Channel
Adding Unmanned Systems to MIO Network: 
Drive-by Search by Sea Fox USV
Video Feed on the Target Vessel Provided by 
Unmanned Surface  Vessel
Adding Unmanned Systems to MIO Network: Drive-by Search by 
USV,  UAV Relay to the Fast Boat, UGV in the Tunnel
USV provided radiation detection in small-boat drive-by with 
real-time expert reachback; network-controlled USV & UGV
MIO Testbed Operation Challenges: 
NOC Response
View of Performance and Fault 
Management Monitors
View of the tactical wireless 
OFDM 802.16 link behavior 
NOC Adaptive Management Model: 
Facilitator/Coordinator  Feedback Loop
Network-aware nodes in UAV-based HVT 
operations: mapping SNMP data into the SA view
Adaptive Networking at the Situational 
Awareness Interface Level:  Network-on-Target
• The NoT process starts at the level of 
Situational Awareness Interface used by 
the local or higher echelon commander, 
to point onto  the Target, which in this 
case is  the site to be reached by the 
self-configuring network
• In response the mobile networking 
node, i.e. small boat, light 
reconnaissance vehicle, or operator are 
moved to the area to extend the tactical 
mesh  
• If the site is too far, or the preceding 
links are about to break down, the UAV  
is deployed to stretch the network 
further to the remote most node , or to 
heal the overstretched intermediate link 
NoT at Work : Remote and Self-Alignment of 
Broadband Point-to-Point Antennas
• This in turn would require rapid 
and frequent re-alignment, of the 
antenna assets including panel 
switching and tune-up decisions 
made right at the level of local 
commander situational awareness 
view 
• More so, the commander’s  remote 
advisers, located  thousands miles 
away  of surveillance and targeting 
area would be able to see the 
effects of the healing assets 
deployment in the Situational 
Awareness view and assist the 
commander in re-aligning and 
stretching the mobile network to 
the target area 
NoT (SAOFDM Solution) at Work
SAOFDM_MIO.swf
Collaborative Technology
Geographically Distributed Collaborative C2 
and Data Fusion Environment
Distributed team of 
Experts and Command 
Officers: Mobile 





Boarding Party Self-Synchronization with TOC 
and DTRA in Groove
TNT MIO 06-4 : Feasibility of using innovative self-aligning broad 
band wireless solutions to support boarding and target vessels on-
the-move,  boarding party real time collaboration with coalition 
partners and first responders
(August 30-September 1, 2006)





















Class on Collaborative Technologies
Network Operations Center and Data Collection site via groove
Network Support team and Experiment Control (act as back up to make all 
necessary inject should network connectivity problems exclude certain players). 
Swedish Team
Maritime Security Office of the Port of Oakland
observing and supporting experiment control by scenario injects made via groove, SA, 
and by video feed  (with CDR Leif Hansson in Lead)
Austrian Team
Port of Hong Kong (where the containers were loaded) 
observing and supporting experiment control by scenario injects made via Groove, 
SA, and by video feed (with Dr. Ulrich Hofmann in Lead, Ulrich Wagner as 
Technical POC)
Team in Singapore 
Shipper of the cargo containers
observing and supporting experiment control by scenario injects made via Groove, 
SA, and by video feed (with Dr. Yu Chiann in Lead)
DHS Science & Technologies CounterMeasures Test Beds
Office of Emergency Services
Assists CalOES and DOE RAP
Participating Units
Alameda County Sheriff’s  Office Marine Patrol 
Unit  Boat and RHIB– Boarding vessel, deploys 
boarding party and does drive by (carries IST detector)
Oakland Police Boat 35 the target vessel 
OFT Stiletto Ship-remote early warning command 
post en route to San Diego area
USCG 
District 11 Watch Officer
PAC Area Watch Officer 




Providing source, source security, and data files for detection teams 
(if necessary)
Providing remote analysis cell from Livermore via Groove
Provide mapping facility of bay showing critical facilities (HOPS), 
radiation detection reachback and atmospheric modeling reachback
LLNL Watch Officer – remote cell (operating from NPS)
2 members of Boarding Party (with radiation detectors)
BFC (Biometrics Fusion Center)
Providing data files for detection teams,
Providing remote support for exercise database search and results 
reporting via Groove collaborative software
SOCOM  Observers
Remote Navy Asset: OFT Stiletto Ship in 
San Diego
Boarding Party Situational Understanding 
Development via Collaboration with Expert and 
Command Remote Sites
Getting Drive-by Search Feedback 
from Sweden
Source Detection Feedback from 
Singapore
EWall Integration with Groove: Combining Biometrics 
Identification (NBFC row), Radiation Detection (LLNL row ) 
and Groove events at the distributed locations (Alerts row )
-
MIO 06-4 Findings
• SAOFDM-based experimental adaptive on-demand ship-to-shore 
network provide expected connectivity and level of bandwidth capable 
of carrying on several video streams and data sharing situational 
awareness applications.   While on the move at speeds 3-5 nm/hour and 
zigzag maneuvering of the Boarding Vessel trying to chase the Target, 
the SAOFDM node by using designed self-aligning algorithm applied 
via the control channel enabled to keep ship-to-shore directional link 
intact, providing transmission rates up to 5 Mbps. 
• Collaborative technology (shared workspaces, SA, video tools) 
performed well, enabling  simultaneous radiation detection  and 
analysis taking place in different geographically distributed locations. 
• We observed successful SA integration with early drive-by detection of 
radioactive source on board of truck in Bavarian Alps (upper right 
view), by the first time in action Stiletto ship in San Diego (lower right 
view) and plum detection of the boat in SF Bay (lower left view). For the 
first time three surface nodes and three overseas command posts 
(Swedish Navy, Singapore DTSA, and Austria (Salzburg Research) 
acted together with District 11 (CG), YBI TOC and NPS NOC.
CRS 6/25/2007 # 49
Tactical Network Topology Maritime Interdiction Operation Experiments: 
Enabling Radiation Awareness and Geographical Distributed 
Collaboration for Network-Centric Maritime Interdiction Operations
December 5-8, 2006
Arden Dougan
International Maritime Domain Security Symposium
This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by University of California Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under Contract W-7405-Eng-48.
UCRL-PRES-226372 
Doc#-50
TNT Maritime Interdiction Operation Test Bed
• Tests cutting edge technology for WMD detection and communications 
in maritime environment
— Communications in harsh environments, between moving ships at sea




Drive-By Radiation Detector: ARAM – Adaptable 
Radiation Area Monitor
• Real time radiation monitoring system
• Spectral data analyzed to quickly 
provide actionable information 
— flow of commerce not impeded 




Radiation Sources used in TNT
• Naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM)
— Radium smoke detector








Surrogate Radiation Sources used to simulate special 
nuclear materials
• Plutonium surrogate
— Mimics Pu for 1st response 
detectors
— DOT Limited and Excepted 
Quantity for easy transport
— Field life 2-3 months (renewable)
Doc#-54
Explosives detection kit - ELITE
• Colorimetric explosives detection system 
• Simple to use swipe test, immediate results, 
requires little training
• Detects over 25 explosives and their 
precursors
• Low nanogram detection limits
• Swipes and tests potentially contaminated 
areas




— Analyze radiation spectra 
— Determine quality of data
— Ask for additional information (background spectra, photos)
• Consequence Analysts
— Plume modeling 
— Access to maps, atmospheric modeling, hazardous chemicals database 
• Export Control Experts
— Analyze photos of items 
• Emergency Response Coordinators
— Advanced planning (direct movement of ships, area vulnerabilities, etc.)
Doc#-56
Examples of Radiation Reachback
Who: unknown
What: A truck loaded with an cargo 
container
When: A time ago (exact time 
unknown)
Where: Entrance into the Hong Kong 
seaport
How: Portal monitor
Specials: No neutrons observed, just 
gamma radiation
There is one item that was added to 
CalMart's shipment, not normally part of 
their shipment. This item is sent by George 




Request worst case scenario for vessel carrying materials 
listed above. 
Current location is 37-47.04N 122-21.28W.  winds from SW
The TNT MIO Node in 
Singapore
Dr Foo Yu Chiann
Project Manager
Defence Science and Technology Agency
Experiment Set-up
• The Singapore node is connected to the MIO collaborative 
environment through a Virtual Private Network (VPN) established 
between DSTA and NPS.
• 3 wireless laptops 
connected via 








• Singapore played the role of the shipping company that 
had unknowingly transported the radioactive cargo (via 
Port of Hong Kong) as part of its shipment
• Provided the shipping manifest of the cargo containers to 
Port of Hong Kong and MIFC to aid investigations 
Role for MIO-07 
• Simulated the boarding & search of a vessel that 
may have a nuclear device
– Radiation profile and photo of the suspicious item sent 
via collaborative environment for reachback analysis at 
LLNL
Observations
• The Experiments have provided insights on the 
possible new operational capabilities that could be 
achieved with collaborative networking
– Allow boarding team immediate access to remote 
expertise during boarding operations
– Shorten decision-making processes
• Way ahead
– Explore how such collaborative technologies could be 
applied for our own operations
SJÖSTRIDSSKOLAN
Swedish Naval Warfare Centre 
Wireless Broadband supporting Maritime 
Security in Littoral Waters
SJÖSTRIDSSKOLAN
TNT 07-1
Sweden acted as a counterpart MIO agency, 
conducted the same operations and exchanged 
real time information that was analysed by the 
reachback organisation.
Radiation data (provided by the CBRN centre)
Calculated radiation spread (provided of the CBRN centre)
Live video feed




Connectivity with all participants
Posted files where analysed





The Swedish goal for 
participating in the TNT 
experiments
• Use the experiments as stepstones to be 
able to conduct the Swedish TNT 
experiment fall 2008
SJÖSTRIDSSKOLAN














































Demonstration vest developed in collaboration











• Real time communication of voice, data and sensorinformation
• Integrated in the combat suit (jacket)
• Adapt sensors to the specific mission/task
• Possibility to supervice physiological status and position
of the soldier
• Presentation of alarm and data to the solider (MMI)
SJÖSTRIDSSKOLAN
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Questions?
